![]() However, planners need to have realistic expectations about what even very fit and highly-trained military specialists can do under such circumstances. Special Forces units designed to move lightly across challenging geography may be considered in such situations. In the Indo-Pacific region, rugged jungle terrain remains the site of ongoing guerrilla warfare and is often where conventional military units cannot be usefully deployed. In several cases, malaria and other infections such as scrub typhus and dysentery largely determined the interval before the infantry became combat ineffective. This is not true for long- range penetration patrols that may last for weeks, such as in Burma and East Timor during World War II. Special Forces operations are often of such short duration that infectious disease incubation periods minimise mission impact. Improved regimens that are better tolerated and last for extended periods are still required. Chemoprophylaxis remains the best preventive intervention to keep heavily exposed soldiers free of malaria symptoms. ![]() In the Australian Imperial Force, 2/2 Independent Company were eventually evacuated in late 1942 after months in East Timor with essentially all survivors infected with malaria. ![]() During the Allied campaign against the Imperial Japanese Army in Burma in 1943–1944, long-range penetration patrols by both the United States (US) Army (Merrill’s Marauders) and British/Indian Army (Chindits) were heavily affected by malaria, causing the majority of their disease casualties. During World War II, malaria often determined the extent of special operations simply by limiting the time a unit could be deployed in a tropical jungle before fever incapacitated it. Although Special Forces may expect high casualty rates, such highly-trained soldiers cannot afford infectious disease losses. ![]()
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